advertisement
advertisement

This is page 2 of:

Skim Scam: Did Aldi Invite 11-State Coordinated Attacks?

October 6th, 2010

Still, if hacked card readers had been installed in one Aldi store, or in a group of stores spread around a single city, it would be unremarkable. But over the summer, it happened in 10 urban areas&#8212and all the cases appear to be related.

Look at those cities on a map, and the striking thing is that they’re so spread out. How could one gang of cyberthieves hit that many stores in that many areas at once, swapping the skimmer-equipped PIN pads in and out to collect card information?

Maybe they didn’t. It may be that this really was a summer road trip by one set of thieves. It could be a simple enough process: Steal PIN pads from a few Aldi stores. Install skimmers in them. Distribute them to stores spread across a city and its suburbs. Wait a day or so, then swap the original PIN pads back in the stores, collect the card information and head for the next city on your list to repeat the routine.

If the thieves waited until their trip was done before using the stolen card information, they might have spent weeks collecting it without getting caught. That would explain why the money started being taken from ATMs suddenly—and thousands of miles from the tampered card readers.

These kind of physical attacks should be much less common than they are, and they would be that much less common if retailers were more meticulous about reviewing their network activity logs, said QSA-and StorefrontBacktalk PCI Columnist-Walter Conway. “There should be huge red flags in the logs if anyone disconnects a terminal. That should immediately trigger an alert,” he said.

If the thieves are especially brazen-and come prepared with vision-blocking props and a couple of accomplices skilled at distracting an employee-they might be able to attack the machine without actually disconnecting it from the network. “Done properly, it should only take 5 to 10 minutes and probably closer to five,” Conway said. “You solder a couple of wires and you put the top back on. You could do it very quickly, but you have to expose yourself.”

However, on-the-spot tampering would also be very risky, requiring that the cashier be distracted for as many as five or ten minutes without noticing someone hanging around the unattended checkout line. Even with minimal staffing, that wouldn’t be easy in a typical Aldi store with its shotgun layout, where everything is visible from anywhere in the store.

Truly sophisticated tampering might even include setting up the hacked card readers to transmit card data by Bluetooth or across the Internet. But that seems less likely. It’s a lot more work and expense to collect data from just a few hundred cards at each store.

There’s another, more unnerving, possibility: that there were actually 10 groups of thieves, one in each of the areas where the skimmers were installed. That would involve a lot more coordination among the thieves, and might signal far more headaches for retailers facing the prospect of gangs of cyberthieves who could hit stores in multiple cities at once.

Then again, cyberthieves are known for being fond of Internet discussion groups so finding like-minded thieves wouldn’t be that difficult, which would explain the widely dispersed geographies hit and the ease with which the numbers could be cashed out thousands of miles away.


advertisement

4 Comments | Read Skim Scam: Did Aldi Invite 11-State Coordinated Attacks?

  1. billblack Says:

    As a person that works for a company specializing in hardware and pinpads in the grocery market, I find this hard to believe. Any pinpad (unsure what Aldi uses) that has been manufactured in the past few years loses its PIN Encryption if tampered with. Hell, we have customers that “bump” them hard and they will lose encryption. Sometimes they loose encryption in shipping too. Trust me, it is difficult to get pinpads injected with either legacy DUKPT keys or TDES keys. Serial numbers are logged with the company doing the encryptions (TASQ, POS Portal, etc). Isn’t this covered in the PCI PTS standard?

  2. Evan Schuman Says:

    Editor’s Note: This was addressed and it appeared that the pads in question were older.

  3. Anon Says:

    We have one here in Albemarle NC. Does anyone know if that store was affected also? Our stupid paper here has not said one thing about it!

  4. Anony Says:

    US definitely needs to upgrade to chip & pin. There are 100 ways to skim the mag stripe data and once thats available you just need a 4 digit pin to withdraw/purchase anything.

Newsletters

StorefrontBacktalk delivers the latest retail technology news & analysis. Join more than 60,000 retail IT leaders who subscribe to our free weekly email. Sign up today!
advertisement

Most Recent Comments

Why Did Gonzales Hackers Like European Cards So Much Better?

I am still unclear about the core point here-- why higher value of European cards. Supply and demand, yes, makes sense. But the fact that the cards were chip and pin (EMV) should make them less valuable because that demonstrably reduces the ability to use them fraudulently. Did the author mean that the chip and pin cards could be used in a country where EMV is not implemented--the US--and this mis-match make it easier to us them since the issuing banks may not have as robust anti-fraud controls as non-EMV banks because they assumed EMV would do the fraud prevention for them Read more...
Two possible reasons that I can think of and have seen in the past - 1) Cards issued by European banks when used online cross border don't usually support AVS checks. So, when a European card is used with a billing address that's in the US, an ecom merchant wouldn't necessarily know that the shipping zip code doesn't match the billing code. 2) Also, in offline chip countries the card determines whether or not a transaction is approved, not the issuer. In my experience, European issuers haven't developed the same checks on authorization requests as US issuers. So, these cards might be more valuable because they are more likely to get approved. Read more...
A smart card slot in terminals doesn't mean there is a reader or that the reader is activated. Then, activated reader or not, the U.S. processors don't have apps certified or ready to load into those terminals to accept and process smart card transactions just yet. Don't get your card(t) before the terminal (horse). Read more...
The marketplace does speak. More fraud capacity translates to higher value for the stolen data. Because nearly 100% of all US transactions are authorized online in real time, we have less fraud regardless of whether the card is Magstripe only or chip and PIn. Hence, $10 prices for US cards vs $25 for the European counterparts. Read more...
@David True. The European cards have both an EMV chip AND a mag stripe. Europeans may generally use the chip for their transactions, but the insecure stripe remains vulnerable to skimming, whether it be from a false front on an ATM or a dishonest waiter with a handheld skimmer. If their stripe is skimmed, the track data can still be cloned and used fraudulently in the United States. If European banks only detect fraud from 9-5 GMT, that might explain why American criminals prefer them over American bank issued cards, who have fraud detection in place 24x7. Read more...

StorefrontBacktalk
Our apologies. Due to legal and security copyright issues, we can't facilitate the printing of Premium Content. If you absolutely need a hard copy, please contact customer service.