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Losing Control Of Almost Everything In The Cloud

February 1st, 2012

The same is true of the cloud.

The users of MegaUpload were told that the storage was safe and secure and that MegaUpload would never share their data with anyone. As the Grateful Dead explained, “if you’ve got a warrant, I guess you’re gonna come in.”

The benefit of the cloud for retailers is that they can go “all in.” Everything becomes “as a service.” Customer data, inventory, supply chain, marketing, sales and HR all become services to be outsourced to third parties anywhere in the world. But if any government anywhere around the world decides that either the cloud provider or one of the cloud users is doing something improper, it may seize the entire cloud—with the innocent retailer’s data.

Contract language may not help here, because the actions of the government may act as a force majure preventing the cloud provider from complying with contractual obligations. What is worse, unlike a “search and seizure,” where the government seeks evidence of criminal conduct (and must, at least in the U.S., limit what it can look at and use), when the government “seizes” the cloud provider’s assets not as evidence but as fruits of illegal activity, it may not be required to give it back to a so-called “innocent owner,” like the merchant.

The legislative proposal causes similar concerns. Much of the U.S. “critical infrastructure”—transportation, telecommunications, energy, chemicals, banking, etc.—are held by the private sector. The government has a legitimate interest in ensuring and promoting both privacy and security in that infrastructure, for national security reasons. As such, it has long been proposed that participants in this critical infrastructure have a security and privacy “scorecard,” some set of reasonable standards or goals against which they are measured. This necessarily implies that there be some type of “carrot” or “stick” to encourage compliance or punish noncompliance.

What the legislation (as yet undisclosed) suggests is that, at least for government contractors, if a member of the critical infrastructure fails to meet the standard, the government has the right to essentially “take over” the IT infrastructure to make it compliant. Good idea? Horrible idea?

Hard to say. The devil is always in the details. Many government contracts permit the government to ensure compliance with the contract and regulations and, under certain circumstances, to take over for the contractor. If a contractor was, for example, running an unsafe railroad on behalf of the government, it would not be unreasonable to allow the government to step in and say (particularly after trying to get the contractor to comply) “Hey, let us run it.” On the other hand, nobody ever really passes an IT security audit.

Security is a process, not a goal. There will always be areas of noncompliance, failure to meet a standard or trying to adapt a new or old technology to a standard. Should every company in the critical infrastructure worry that an exception to one issue in an audit means that the government will not only take over the infrastructure but, like in the MegaUpload case, have access to everything on the infrastructure? I certainly hope not.

So what is a retailer to do? Don’t panic. Decisions about when and how to adopt new technologies (like the cloud) or to outsource IT infrastructure to third parties must be made on a rational cost/benefit basis—as long as you appropriately weigh the true costs and benefits. After considering cost savings and security, retailers must ask, “how will this benefit my business” and “is it worth the risk?” Finally, retailers must ask “how do I manage the risk I am taking?” This may mean having a disaster recovery plan independent of a primary cloud provider, retaining certain key features in-house or otherwise taking plans in case of a government take over. Remember that the risk of this happening is low. But when you put all your eggs in one basket, you should make sure that the basket is safe.

If you disagree with me, I’ll see you in court, buddy. If you agree with me, however, I would love to hear from you.

—Sophia Shahnami, a legal researcher and writer in Winter Park, Fla., contributed to this column.


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