advertisement
advertisement

This is page 2 of:

Why Amazon Didn’t Fix Its Password Glitch: A Longtime Hole

February 2nd, 2011

Why couldn’t Amazon just automatically convert a customer to the new password system by, say, capturing the complete password that a customer typed in, authenticating it using the old system, and then storing that full password in the new system? Because the customer might easily have typed the password wrong just that once. Then any automated password-entry systems, such as Web browsers set to remember passwords, would no longer work.

And, understandably, Amazon didn’t want to simply force customers to change their passwords. That’s a standard tactic IT departments use with employees, but it doesn’t exactly make customers feel warm and friendly toward an E-tailer.

Ironically, a customer who did a password “change” to exactly the same password would end up in the new system but with his old password—this time in a more secure form.

There’s another bit of irony, too: Customers who asked Amazon’s customer support desk about the glitch were reportedly told that they should try changing their passwords. The support people didn’t know why that should work. But, naturally, when the password was changed, it would be moved into the newer, no-shortening-or-case-conversion password-security system.

Amazon won’t say what, if anything, it plans to change in the wake of all the publicity about its password security. But the publicity alone will likely prompt many customers to change their passwords, just to be safe.

All the publicity could also mean that old-fashioned password-cracking attempts could see a revival at other E-tail sites in the next few weeks. Think about it from the thief’s point of view: If Amazon had an outdated password system that it didn’t fix until a few years ago, how many other E-tailers—especially older sites—are still using the same type of easier-to-guess approach?

And even if those older E-tailers have converted to a stronger system, how many of them—like Amazon—concluded there was no good way to move customers over to the more secure approach and decided just to let customers become more secure when they changed passwords—if they ever got around to doing that?

For a thief, that’s probably worth a look. And that could mean more E-tailers soon scrambling to explain why their passwords are so flexible.


advertisement

One Comment | Read Why Amazon Didn’t Fix Its Password Glitch: A Longtime Hole

  1. TooTallSid Says:

    And, hopefully, they were storing the passwords as unrecoverable salted hashes, anyway. (In Amazon’s case, it was probably Dinty Moore hashes. :O)

    If stored properly, passwords are never recoverable and thus, unconvertable.

Newsletters

StorefrontBacktalk delivers the latest retail technology news & analysis. Join more than 60,000 retail IT leaders who subscribe to our free weekly email. Sign up today!
advertisement

Most Recent Comments

Why Did Gonzales Hackers Like European Cards So Much Better?

I am still unclear about the core point here-- why higher value of European cards. Supply and demand, yes, makes sense. But the fact that the cards were chip and pin (EMV) should make them less valuable because that demonstrably reduces the ability to use them fraudulently. Did the author mean that the chip and pin cards could be used in a country where EMV is not implemented--the US--and this mis-match make it easier to us them since the issuing banks may not have as robust anti-fraud controls as non-EMV banks because they assumed EMV would do the fraud prevention for them Read more...
Two possible reasons that I can think of and have seen in the past - 1) Cards issued by European banks when used online cross border don't usually support AVS checks. So, when a European card is used with a billing address that's in the US, an ecom merchant wouldn't necessarily know that the shipping zip code doesn't match the billing code. 2) Also, in offline chip countries the card determines whether or not a transaction is approved, not the issuer. In my experience, European issuers haven't developed the same checks on authorization requests as US issuers. So, these cards might be more valuable because they are more likely to get approved. Read more...
A smart card slot in terminals doesn't mean there is a reader or that the reader is activated. Then, activated reader or not, the U.S. processors don't have apps certified or ready to load into those terminals to accept and process smart card transactions just yet. Don't get your card(t) before the terminal (horse). Read more...
The marketplace does speak. More fraud capacity translates to higher value for the stolen data. Because nearly 100% of all US transactions are authorized online in real time, we have less fraud regardless of whether the card is Magstripe only or chip and PIn. Hence, $10 prices for US cards vs $25 for the European counterparts. Read more...
@David True. The European cards have both an EMV chip AND a mag stripe. Europeans may generally use the chip for their transactions, but the insecure stripe remains vulnerable to skimming, whether it be from a false front on an ATM or a dishonest waiter with a handheld skimmer. If their stripe is skimmed, the track data can still be cloned and used fraudulently in the United States. If European banks only detect fraud from 9-5 GMT, that might explain why American criminals prefer them over American bank issued cards, who have fraud detection in place 24x7. Read more...

StorefrontBacktalk
Our apologies. Due to legal and security copyright issues, we can't facilitate the printing of Premium Content. If you absolutely need a hard copy, please contact customer service.