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Running head: STATUS, REPUTATION, AND ALTRUISM
Going Green to Be Seen:
Status, Reputation, and Conspicuous Conservation
Vladas Griskevicius
University of Minnesota
Joshua M. Tybur
University of New Mexico
Bram Van den Bergh
Rotterdam School of Management
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 2
Abstract
Why do people purchase pro-environmental “green” products? We argue that buying
such products can be construed as altruistic, since green products often cost more and are of
lower quality than their conventional counterparts, but green goods benefit the environment for
everyone. Because biologists have observed that altruism might function as a “costly signal”
associated with status, we examined in three experiments how status motives influenced desire
for green products. Activating status motives led people to choose green products over more
luxurious non-green products. Supporting the notion that altruism signals one’s willingness and
ability to incur costs for others’ benefit, status motives increased desire for green products when
shopping in public (but not private), and when green products cost more (but not less) than nongreen
products. Findings suggest that status competition can promote pro-environmental
behavior.
Keywords: Altruism, environmental conservation, costly signaling, status competition, consumer
behavior
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 3
Going Green to Be Seen: Status, Reputation, and Conspicuous Conservation
“A good reputation is more valuable than money” –Publilius Syrus, 100 B.C.
Consider the following car: compact sedan with a small trunk, standard cloth seats,
excellent gas mileage, and a sluggish engine. It might not sound like much, but these features
describe one of the most successful cars in recent U.S. history: the Toyota Prius, a small-statured
automobile coveted across demographic categories. Why is the Prius is so successful?
One possibility is that the Prius is a hybrid gas-electric vehicle, meaning that it costs less
to fuel. Yet it costs many thousands of dollars more to purchase the Prius than a conventional but
highly fuel-efficient car such as the Honda Civic. Another possibility is that the Prius has lower
emissions, making it more environmentally friendly and “green” than conventional cars.
Environmentally conscious consumers may thus be willing to spend more for a car that may
sacrifice on performance, features, or comfort to help the environment. Yet when the New York
Times reported the top five reasons why Prius owners bought their cars, environmental
conservation was last on the list. Instead, Prius owners proudly reported that the number one
reason for purchasing the car is because it “makes a statement about me.” What statement does
the Prius make? “It shows the world that its owner cares” (Maynard, 2007, July 4).
At first blush it may seem puzzling why individuals would pay a premium to forgo
luxury or comfort for the sake of displaying that they care. The current research, however,
suggests that there may be important links between displays of caring, environmental behaviors,
and competition for status. Whereas traditional approaches associate status with preferences for
luxury and self-indulgence, we argue that activating status motives can lead people to shy away
from luxury and instead choose self-sacrifice. Our framework draws on costly signaling theory
(Miller, 2000; Zahavi, 1975) and on research on competitive altruism (Roberts, 1998; Van Vugt,
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 4
Roberts, & Hardy, 2007), which posit that conspicuous displays of altruism can function to build
and maintain costly pro-social reputations. We argue that green products can demonstrate to
others that their owners are voluntarily willing and able to incur the cost of owning a product that
benefits the environment (and society), but that may be inferior for personal use. Because
voluntary acts of self-sacrifice and the ability to incur costs are associated with status, the current
work points to underlying reasons why nice guys—and gals—can finish first (Dreber, Rand,
Fudenberg, & Nowak, 2008; Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006; Jensen-Campbell, Graziano, & West,
1995). More broadly, this research contributes to a better understanding of the links between
altruism, status, and conservation, while also providing the first test of whether activating status
motives can be a viable strategy for promoting pro-environmental behavior.
Motivation and Environmental Conservation
Considering the detrimental environmental effects produced by pollution, overpopulation,
and depletion of natural resources, numerous scholars and public officials have called for
increased urgency in motivating people to engage in pro-environmental behaviors. One
significant way of meeting such calls involves our behavior as consumers. For example, people
often have the option of switching from conventional products to energy-efficient or reusable
“green” products. Yet while green options are becoming more widely available, many barriers to
change remain (Dietz, Ostrom, & Stern, 2003). For instance, people are notoriously reluctant to
change familiar patterns of behavior, and making a switch to green behaviors often necessitates
making sacrifices (e.g., paying more for a less effective product).
Following a burst of research on energy conservation in the wake of the 1970s energy
crisis, researchers have continued to investigate strategies that promote conservation behaviors
(e.g., Goldstein, Griskevicius, & Cialdini, 2009; Gonzalez, Aronson, & Costanzo, 1988; Schultz
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 5
et al., 1995; Van Vugt & Samuelson, 1999; Van Vugt, 2001). Developing an effective strategy,
however, requires consideration of the underlying motives for conservation. Several such
motives have been identified (e.g., Iyer & Kashyap, 2007; Stern, 1999), each suggesting different
strategies for spurring conservation.
According to an environmental concern perspective (e.g., Bamberg, 2003; Fransson &
Gärling, 1999; Stern & Dietz, 1994), people are presumed to engage in conservation primarily
because they, at some level, intrinsically care about the well-being of the planet and its
inhabitants. To motivate green behavior from this perspective, an effective strategy involves
better informing people about the plight of the environment (Owens, 2000). Accordingly,
information campaigns about the precarious state of the planet should lead people to behave in a
pro-environmental fashion, even if going green requires some sacrifice on the part of consumers.
In contrast to the environmental concern perspective, a rational economic perspective suggests
that conservation is primarily driven by economic reasons (e.g., Cone & Hayes, 1980; Geller,
1989). Accordingly, an effective way to motivate people to go green is by making green products
cheaper, more efficient, and providing consumers with financial incentives (e.g., tax breaks) to
buy them (e.g., Matsukawa et al., 2000; Van Vugt, Meertens, & Van Lange, 1995).
Motives related to environmental concern and economic advantage can certainly spur
conservation. Yet recent research suggests that other more socially oriented motives may be even
more powerful at influencing people’s tendencies to conserve (Van Vugt, in press). Consider, for
example, the types of appeals that spur hotel guests to re-use their towels. Given the messages
that are consistently placed in hotel rooms across the world (Goldstein & Cialdini, 2007), hotel
managers appear to presume that guests will be motivated by environmental concerns (“please
conserve to help the environment”) and/or by economic reasons (“please help keep your costs
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 6
low”). Indeed, when people are surveyed about which messages they believe would be most
effective, environmental and economic appeals are rated the highest (Nolan et al., 2008). Yet
field experiments in hotels and residential communities reveal that significantly higher levels of
conservation are generated by appeals that tap into the social nature of conservation, such as
information about the conservation behaviors of other hotel guests or one’s neighbors (e.g.,
Goldstein et al., 2008; Schultz et al., 2007). Thus, people appear to be particularly sensitive to
the social and reputational aspects of conservation and cooperation (Bateson, Nettle, & Roberts,
2006). For example, people are more likely to give money in a public goods game to preserve the
environment when the giving is public and can influence one’s reputation (Milinski, Semmann,
Krambeck, & Marotzke, 2006), suggesting that many consumers might buy green products such
as the Prius less for environmental or economic reasons, and more for social reasons.
Conservation, Reputation, and Status
Taking a closer look at the reputation aspects of conservation, consider what a person
can communicate about himself by going green. By purchasing a Toyota Prius, for example, a
person can signal to others that he is a pro-social, rather than a pro-self, individual. That is,
instead of buying a conventional and more luxurious car that would benefit only him, the Prius
owner instead voluntarily chooses to benefit the environment for everyone—even though this act
means forgoing the luxury of having a car with more features, comfort, or performance.
Pro-social behavior can have important functional consequences. Engaging in pro-social
behaviors such as environmental conservation, for example, can build a pro-social reputation
(Semmann, Krambeck, & Milinski, 2005; Wedekind & Braithwaite, 2002). Having a reputation
as a cooperative and helpful group member can be extremely valuable: Such individuals are not
only seen as more trustworthy (Barclay, 2004), but they are more desirable as friends, allies, and
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 7
romantic partners (Cottrell, Neuberg, & Li, 2007; Griskevicius et al., 2007; Iredale, Van Vugt, &
Dunbar, 2008; Miller, 2007; Stiff & Van Vugt, 2008). Importantly, being pro-social without
being obsequious is associated with status in a group. The definition of status necessarily implies
a hierarchy of rewards, whereby higher status individuals have greater access to desirable things.
Although status can be achieved through dominance (e.g., by force), here we focus on status as
achieved through prestige, meaning that status is gained through freely conferred deference
(Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Research has shown that self-sacrifice for the benefit of a group of
strangers has been shown to increase the self-sacrificer’s status in that group, including the
likelihood that the person will be selected as a leader (Gurven et al., 2000; Hardy & Van Vugt,
2006; Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002). The notion that pro-social individuals are
desirable to have in positions of power suggests that pro-social behavior may be a viable strategy
for attaining status.
Competitive Altruism and Costly Signaling
Considering the status-enhancing benefits of cooperation, one might expect that people
would strive to be seen as pro-social. Indeed, individuals across diverse cultures and historical
periods are known to compete for status by trying to be seen as relatively more altruistic—a
concept known as competitive altruism (Barclay & Willer 2007; Hawkes, 1993; Roberts, 1998;
Van Vugt, Roberts, & Hardy, 2007). For example, in the Native American Kwakiutl tribal
practice of potlatching, tribal chiefs compete to give away their possessions (Cole & Chaikin,
1990). Accordingly, the person who is able to give away the most resources is regarded as the
highest standing member in the group (Murdock, 1970). Anthropologists have observed similar
cases of altruistic signaling in numerous hunter-gatherer societies, including the Ache of
Paraguay and the Meriam of Australia (Smith & Bird, 2000). Among the Shuar of the Amazon,
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 8
for instance, individuals who take on voluntary administration jobs are rewarded with status and
prestige (Price, 2003). From the conspicuously large donations made by modern-day tycoons
such as Ted Turner or Bill Gates, to the sponsorship of trans-Atlantic voyages and opulent operas
by European royals, and to the desire to be the nicest dinner-party hostess, competitive altruism
perforates across historical and contemporary cultures (Boone, 1998; Griskevicius et al., 2007).
The prevalence of competitive altruism, however, presents a theoretical conundrum. Selfsacrifice,
especially repeated self-sacrifice, is costly. Altruism by definition benefits others at the
cost of depleting the giver’s resources needed for survival, reproduction, or kin care (Barrett,
Dunbar, & Lycett, 2002; Tooby & Cosmides, 1996). For this reason, a rational economic
perspective considers altruism to be a theoretical “anomaly” (Dawes & Thaler, 1988). The
existence of altruism is similarly puzzling from an evolutionary, gene selection perspective
(Dakwins, 1976). Although the theories of inclusive fitness (Hamilton, 1964) and reciprocal
altruism (Trivers, 1971) have explained helping between kin and social allies, the process
underlying the evolution of altruism between strangers or toward individuals who cannot
reciprocate remains unclear (e.g., see Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2007; McAndrew, 2002;
Van Vugt & Van Lange, 2006).
One explanation for the prevalence of altruism stems from costly signaling theory
(Zahavi, 1975; Grafen, 1990). This theory was developed in the field of behavioral ecology and
has garnered much theoretical and empirical support in studies of both animal signaling and
human behavioral ecology (e.g., Gintis, Smith, & Bowles, 2001; Gurven, Allen-Arave, Hill, &
Hurtado, 2000; Lotem, Fishman, & Stone, 2002; Smith & Bird, 2000; Sosis, 2000). Costly
signaling theory, however, has only recently emerged as a framework for understanding aspects
of human psychology (e.g., Griskevicius et al., 2007; Miller, 2000). According to a costly
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 9
signaling perspective, an altruistic act is a communicative signal. This signal, however,
communicates more than a person’s prosociality; altruism can also signal an individual’s ability
to incur costs (Bird & Smith, 2005). That is, in addition to signaling that a person is prosocial,
altruism can simultaneously signal that one has sufficient time, energy, money, or other valuable
resources to be able to afford to give away such resources without a negative impact on fitness.
Thus, from a costly signaling perspective, incidents of public self-sacrifice are associated with
status because such acts demonstrate both one’s willingness and one’s ability to incur the costs
of self-sacrifice for public welfare.
Arabian babblers, a species of social birds, provide a prototypical non-human example of
self-sacrificial behavior that acts as costly signaling. Individual babblers compete with unrelated
group members to be the group’s sentinel, who is responsible for watching for predators from
tree-tops in order to warn the group of potential danger (Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997). Given that the
sentinel’s duty entails putting oneself at a higher risk of death than other babblers, one might
predict that individuals would attempt to avoid this self-sacrificial job. Yet some studies have
shown that babblers actively compete with each other for this high-status position (Bergstrom &
Lachmann, 2001; but see Wright, 1997). Consistent with costly signaling theory, the more time a
babbler spends as a sentinel, the higher his status and access to mates in the group.
Given the relationship between self-sacrifice and status, costly signaling theory suggests
that people might engage in costly pro-social behaviors such as environmental conservation
particularly when they are motivated to attain status. Because the purchase of green products
enables a person to signal that he is both willing and able to buy a product that benefits others at
a cost to his personal use, activating a motive for status might lead people to engage in
conspicuous conservation—public pro-environmental acts.
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 10
The Current Research
The current research examines how activating status motives influences product choices
when people are choosing between relatively luxurious non-green products that primarily serve
the self versus less-luxurious green products that can benefit society. Consider, for example, a
person looking to buy a new car. Standing in the bustling show room at the local car dealership, a
contemporary consumer is likely to face the following choice: Given a certain budget, should he
buy a more luxurious and higher-performing—but energy-wasteful and more-polluting—car? Or
should he buy a less luxurious and lower-performing—but energy-efficient and less-polluting—
green car (e.g., a Hybrid vehicle)? If the person is motivated to compete for status at the time of
the decision, which of these cars is he more likely to choose?
A traditional perspective suggests that status motives should lead people to choose the
more luxurious product (e.g., Godoy et al., 2007; Rucker & Galinsky, 2008; Sadalla & Krull,
1995). After all, not only is a person likely to enjoy the greater comfort and performance of this
product, but luxurious products have historically been associated with greater wealth. Previous
research, however, does not consider what might happen when people have the option to choose
a pro-social green product. In such a case, choosing the non-green car might suggest to others
that the buyer is a selfish and uncaring individual who is concerned primarily about his own
comfort rather than the welfare of society. Indeed, costly signaling theory suggests that status
motives should lead people to value self-sacrifice and choose the less-luxurious green product.
Experiment 1: Status and Conservation
The first study examined how activating a motive for status influenced choices between
relatively luxurious “non-green” products and less-luxurious pro-environmental “green”
products. Whereas non-green products were superior on dimensions of luxury and performance,
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 11
green products were superior on the dimension of pro-environmental benefits. The two types of
products were always equally priced.1 Because the non-green products were chosen specifically
to be more desirable than their green counterparts, we predicted that non-green products should
be chosen more frequently in the control motive condition. In contrast, we predicted that
activating status motives should increase the likelihood of choosing the less luxurious and more
prosocial green products.
Method
Participants
One-hundred sixty eight students (65 males, 103 females) at a large public university
participated in the study for course credit. All participants came to the lab in small groups and
were seated at computers between partitions.
Design and Procedure
The study had two between-subjects motive conditions: status and control. Status motives
were elicited by having participants read a short story (see below). Participants then made a
series of choices between more luxurious non-green versus less-luxurious green products. To
minimize potential suspicions, a cover story was used. Specifically, participants were told that
they were going to participate in several different studies, whereby the first study concerned
memory. Consistent with this cover story, participants read a short story and were told that they
would be asked to recall information about the story later in the session. However, because it was
important to let some time pass before the memory recall task (ostensibly, to allow for memory
decay), participants would work on another survey regarding product preferences. Post-study
interviews did not reveal any suspiciousness.
1 Indeed, such products are often similarly priced. For example, an upscale 2009 Honda Civic with all of the
available options is about the same price as the base model of the pro-environmental 2009 Honda Civic Hybrid.
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 12
Motive Primes. To elicit status motives, participants read a short story of about 700 words
that has been used successfully to elicit status motives in previous research (see Griskevicius et
al., 2009). In the story, participants imagine graduating from college, looking for a job, and
deciding to go work for a large company because it offers the greatest chance of moving up. The
story describes the person’s first day on the job, focusing on the high-status features of the
workplace such as the upscale lobby and nice furniture. Readers eventually learn that they will
have an opportunity to receive a desirable promotion. The story ends as the reader ponders
moving up in status relative to his/her same-sex peers.
Extensive pilot testing of this manipulation (reported in Griskevicius et al., 2009) showed
that relative to the control story, the status story elicits a “desire for social status” (6.63 vs. 1.97
on a 1-9 scale, p < .001, d = 2.4) and a “desire for prestige” (6.21 vs. 1.88, p < .001, d = 2.3). Compared to the control story, the status story also elicited relatively similar levels of negative affect and positive affect. Importantly, the status story did not mention what the company does or what types of tactics might be useful in gaining status or getting the promotion, meaning that the status manipulation made no mention of cooperation, helping, self-sacrifice, or proenvironmental behavior. In the control condition, participants read a story of similar length designed to elicit similar levels of affect as the status story. Specifically, participants read about losing a ticket to an upcoming concert and searching for the ticket throughout the house. After the person finds the ticket, he/she heads off to the concert with a same-sex peer (see Griskevicius, Cialdini, & Kenrick, 2006). The control and status stories were carefully matched to include interactions with same-sex peers. Status, Reputation, and Altruism 13 To ensure that potential results were not driven by some particular aspect of the control story, the current study included a second control condition in which participants did not read any story. Instead, participants in this condition simply indicated their product choices. We predicted that the two control conditions would not differ from each other on any of the dependent measures. Consistent with this prediction, analyses revealed that the two control conditions did not differ from each other on any of the dependent measures (all ps > .8). The two
control conditions were thus combined for the analyses.
Products. After the motive manipulation, participants proceeded to the next part of the
study (consistent with the cover story). Participants were asked to consider that they were out
shopping for three products: (1) a car, (2) a household cleaner, and (3) a dishwasher. These
products were chosen for the study because all are currently available in a pro-environmental and
a conventional form, and each type of product is pro-environmental in a slightly different manner
(e.g., low CO2 emissions, non-toxic, water efficient).
For each of the three types of products, participants were presented with a choice: the
more luxurious non-green option or the green option. For each choice, the two products were
equal in price, were manufactured by the same company, and were accompanied by three
features that described key aspects of each product. Importantly, the non-green product was
superior on dimensions of luxury and performance, whereas the green product was superior on
the pro-environmental dimension. For example, both the non-green and green dishwasher were
manufactured by Sub-Zero and cost $1,100. The more luxurious non-green dishwasher was an
“ED40 Elite” model, featuring a revolutionary heated drying system that eliminates water spots,
powerful water sprays that produce almost no sound, and comes in a choice of stainless steel or
white exterior with black chrome. In contrast, the less luxurious green dishwasher was an “EcoStatus,
Reputation, and Altruism 14
Trend” model, and had a standard 40-minute running cycle, a re-circulating water system to save
water, and is made with recycled components. The car and household cleaner had similar types
of descriptions specific to those types of product (see Appendix for the full descriptions of all
products).
Because we predicted that status motives should lead people to want to be seen as more
pro-social, it was important that all three green products were perceived as being associated with
more pro-sociality than their non-green counterparts. We thus pre-tested the perceptions of the
three products with a separate group of 112 participants (71 male, 41 female). These participants
saw either the three green products or the three non-green products accompanied with their
complete descriptions (see Appendix). For each of the three products, participants indicated on a
1-9 scale the extent to which the person who owned this product was (1) nice, (2) caring, and (3)
altruistic. As expected, compared to the non-green products, all three green products were
associated with being nicer (Ms = 6.43 vs. 5.43, p <.001, d = 1.4), more caring (Ms = 6.82 vs. 5.47, p <.001, d = 1.9), and more altruistic (Ms = 6.65 vs. 5.50, p <.001, d = 1.5). There were no interactions (ps >.6), meaning that all three products showed similar patterns. Thus, as expected,
people who were to buy any of the three green products relative to their non-green counterparts
were perceived as more prosocial.
In the current experiment, the three types of products were presented in random order.
For each of the three choices, participants were asked the following two-option question: “If you
were out shopping for a car/dishwasher/household cleaner, which of these two products would
you buy?” Because motive did not interact with participant sex for any of the three products (all
ps > .4), the analyses are collapsed across participant sex.
Results and Discussion
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 15
Considering that the non-green version of each product was selected to be superior on
dimensions of luxury and performance, we predicted that participants in the control condition
would be more likely to choose the non-green product. Indeed, as seen in figure 1, in the control
condition participants were more likely to choose the non-green car (62.8% chose the non-green
can, whereas 37.2% chose the green car), the non-green household cleaner (74.3% chose the
non-green cleaner), and the non-green dishwasher (65.5% chose the non-green dishwasher).
Thus, in the absence of status motives, all three non-green products were more desirable than
their green counterparts.
–Figure 1 about here–
The key prediction in the experiment was that activating status motives should increase
the likelihood of choosing the green product relative to the same green product in the control
condition. As seen in figure 1, whereas 37.2% of participants chose the green car in the control
condition, 54.5% of participants chose it in the status condition, ?2 (1, N = 168) = 4.56, p = .033,
? = .165. Similarly, choice of the green cleaner increased from 25.7% in the control condition to
41.8% in the status condition, ?2 (1, N = 168) = 4.52, p = .034, ? = .164. Choice of the green
dishwasher also increased from 34.5% in the control condition to 49.1% in the status condition,
?2 (1, N = 168) = 3.30, p = .069, ? = .140. In addition to examining the influence of status
motives on each product individually, we also analyzed the effect of status when the three
products were combined into a composite. As predicted, a one-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA) on the product composite showed a significant effect of status, F(1, 166) = 8.53, p =
.004, d = .47.
In summary, activating status motives led people to increase the likelihood of choosing
pro-environmental green products over more luxurious non-green products. Consistent with
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 16
predictions, status motives increased people’s tendencies to forgo luxury when given the
opportunity to choose an equally priced green product that could signal one’s prosocial nature.
This study is the first to demonstrate that eliciting status motives can be an effective way to
motivate people to engage in pro-environmental, self-sacrificing behavior.
Experiment 2: Status and Conservation in Public vs. Private
The first study showed that activating status motives increased the tendency to choose a
self-sacrificing prosocial green product over a more luxurious non-green product. This finding
might initially appear puzzling: After all, traditional perspectives predict that status motives
should lead people to especially want luxurious and upscale products (e.g., Godoy et al., 2007).
So why did status motives produce the opposite outcome in Study 1? And when might status
motives lead people to choose luxury over being nice?
According to costly signaling theory, one of the key factors in how status motives should
influence purchasing decisions is the extent to which the purchase is public versus private
(Griskevicius et al., 2007). Public purchases can conspicuously signal characteristics about the
buyer to an immediate audience. Shopping at a store, for example, usually entails interacting
with salespeople, cashiers, and other customers who might see one’s purchases. Accordingly,
costly signaling theory predicts that status motives should lead people to be especially sensitive
to what their behaviors might signal to others when such behavior is observable (e.g., Goldberg,
1995; Harbaugh, 1998; Kurzban, DeScioli, & O’Brien, 2007). In contrast, if a person were to
buy the same product while shopping alone on the computer from his home, the signaling aspects
of the decision are much less salient, suggesting that status motives might have a different effect
on product preferences when shopping in private.
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 17
The second study examined how status motives influenced preferences for green versus
more luxurious non-green products when people considered shopping in a public setting (at a
store) versus a private setting (alone online at home). We predicted that when people considered
shopping in public (as in Study 1), status motives should increase preferences for green products
over more luxurious and better-performing non-green products. In contrast, we predicted that
when people considered shopping in private, status motives should not produce the same
outcome.
Method
Participants
Ninety-three students (58 males, 35 females) at a large public university participated in
the study for course credit. All participants came to the lab in small groups and were seated at
computers that were partitioned from each other.
Design and Procedure
The experiment had a 2 (Motive: status, control) X 2 (Audience: private, public)
between-subjects design. Status motives were elicited by having participants read the same short
story as in the first study; in the control condition participants read the same non-status-related
story as in the first study. After the audience manipulation (see below), participants indicated
their preferences between three green versus three non-green products. To minimize potential
suspicions, the same cover story as in the first study was used.
Public vs. Private. After the motive manipulation, participants saw a specific set of
instructions before indicating their product preferences. In the public condition, similar to Study
1, participants were told: “Imagine that you are out shopping at a store.” In the private condition,
participants were told: “Imagine that you are shopping online by yourself at home.”
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 18
Products. Because the private condition in this study involved shopping online, products
such as cars and dishwashers were not used because most people are unlikely to shop for such
products online. Instead, participants indicated preferences for three products they might
purchase on the Internet: (1) a backpack, (2) batteries, and (3) a table lamp. As in the first study,
participants had a green and a non-green option for each product. Although the two options were
equal in price and were made by the same company, the non-green product was superior on
luxury. In contrast, the green product was inferior on luxury, but had pro-environmental features.
For example, both the more luxurious non-green backpack and the less-luxurious green backpack
were made by The North Face and cost $60. The relatively more luxurious non-green backpack
had a stylish design and was crafted with water-resistant coating, had eight different storage
compartments, and was made from solid synthetic construction. In contrast, the less luxurious
green backpack was made from 100% organic fibers, had a design that minimized waste in the
construction process, and came with instructions on how to recycle the backpack. The batteries
and table lamp had similar types of descriptions specific to those products (see Appendix).
The green and non-green version of each product were presented on the computer screen
at the same time. One of the products was labeled “Product A” and the other was labeled
“Product B.” For each of the three products, participants were asked: “Which of these two
products is more attractive to you?” Preferences were indicated on a 9-point scale with the labels
“definitely product A” and “definitely product B” at the endpoints.
Results and Discussion
We first examined whether the motive and audience manipulations had similar effects on
the three types of products. A three-way repeated-measures ANOVA with type of product as a
within-subject factor did not reveal any interactions (all ps > .50), indicating that the effects of
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 19
motive and audience did not vary between products. The three products were thus combined into
a product composite. As in Study 1, analyses did not reveal any interactions with participant sex
(all ps > .30), so the remainder of the analyses was collapsed across participant sex.
To control for counterbalancing whether preferences for a given product were presented
on the left or right side of the scale, ratings for of the dependent measures were transformed so
that higher numbers indicated preference for green products. Considering that the non-green
products were designed to be superior on luxury and performance, it was expected that nongreen
products would generally be more desirable than the green counterparts. Indeed, as in the
control condition of Study 1, the luxurious non-green products in the control condition were
more desirable relative to their green less luxurious counterpart products. Specifically,
considering that a rating of 5.0 represents equal attractiveness between the non-green and green
product, the mean rating of 3.4 in the control condition suggests that people generally preferred
the more luxurious non-green product (see Figure 2). Product preferences in the control
condition were also not influenced by audience (p > .80), meaning that participants in the control
condition had similar preferences regardless of whether they were considering making a
purchase in public or in private.
–Figure 2 about here–
To examine if status motives had a different effect on preferences depending on
whether people were shopping in public or private, a two-way ANOVA with motive and
audience was performed. This analysis revealed a significant interaction, F(1, 89) = 8.13, p =
.005, ?2 = .084. As predicted, when shopping in public, status motives increased preferences for
green products relative to such preferences in the control condition, F(1,89) = 5.38, p = .023, d =
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 20
.48 (see Figure 2). Thus, as in the first study, activating status motives led people to be more
likely to prefer green products when shopping in public.
When shopping in private, however, status motives produced a very different effect:
Status motives marginally decreased preferences for green products relative to such preferences
in the control condition, F(1,89) = 2.97, p = .058, d = .41. This means that when purchases were
being made in private—when reputational costs were not salient—activating status motives
appears to somewhat increase the attractiveness of luxurious (non-green) products.
In summary, conceptually replicating Study 1, status motives led people to prefer green
products relative to more luxurious non-green products. As in the first study, status motives
increased attractiveness of pro-environmental products specifically when people were shopping
in public. When people were shopping in private, however, status motives increased desire for
luxurious, self-indulgent non-green products. Thus, in line with costly signaling theory, status
motives led people to forgo luxury and desire prosocial environmental products only when it was
salient that such choices could be observed and influence one’s reputation.
Study 3: The Price of Prosociality
The findings so far show that status motives can lead people to prefer green rather than
more luxurious non-green products. Although this finding is consistent with our framework, it
might initially appear contradictory with previous research on status and conservation. For
example, Sadalla & Krull (1995) show that conservation behaviors such as recycling and taking
public transportation are associated with lower status, not higher status. If so, how can status
motives lead people to prefer conservation-friendly green products?
The answer to this puzzle involves a crucial aspect of the first two studies: the price of
the green and the non-green product was equal. That is, when choosing between the more
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 21
luxurious non-green product and the more prosocial green product, price was not a factor.
Changing the relative price of the two products, however, may have important implications for
how status motives should influence desirability of green products. From a rational economic
perspective, for example, making green products cheaper and more affordable is likely to make
them more attractive. After all, many types of green products such as Hybrid cars and energyefficient
light bulbs tend to save money in the long run, meaning that a lower price should make
them more appealing. However, a costly signaling framework suggests that lowering the price of
green products creates an important reputational dilemma: Buying a cheaper (green) product
rather than a more expensive (non-green) product might explicitly signal that a person cannot
afford the more expensive product. Indeed, previous research shows that conservation behaviors
such as taking public transportation are associated with lower status specifically because such
pro-environmental actions signal that the person does not have enough resources to behave
otherwise (Sadalla & Krull, 1995).
From a costly signaling perspective, recall that altruism is associated with status in part
because altruistic displays can function to signal one’s ability to incur costs (i.e., altruism signals
one’s wealth). For example, buying a Hybrid car, which costs several thousand dollars more than
a comparable non-Hybrid car, not only signals that the owner cares about the environment, but it
also signals that the owner can afford to pay the large premium for such a car. If altruism
functions as a costly signal in part because it signals one’s wealth, then increasing the price of a
green product might actually lead that product to be more attractive for individuals motivated to
gain status. Indeed, consider that economic pundits predicted that abolishing tax credits for
Hybrid cars in the U.S. would decrease their sales because of the increase in the cost to buy the
car. Yet after tax credits for the Prius expired in late 2006, sales actually went up by 68.9%
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 22
(Toyota Reports, 2008). Although it is certainly possible that this increase might have been even
larger had the tax incentive remained, pundits were similarly bewildered by Lexus’s decision to
start selling a Hybrid sedan in 2007 priced at over $120,000. Yet again, sales of the
conspicuously pro-environmental and ultra-expensive Lexus LS600h exceeded projections by
over 300% (Lexus Exceeds, 2007). Consistent with a costly signaling perspective on altruism,
both the Prius and the Lexus examples suggest that increasing the price of a pro-environmental
product might actually make it ideally appealing to individuals seeking status, whereby such
products can simultaneously signal that its owner is both caring and wealthy.
In the current study we examined how status motives influenced the attractiveness of
green vs. non-green products when the price of the green product was either higher or lower than
its non-green counterpart (e.g., a Honda Accord costing $24,000 [30,000] versus a Honda
Accord Hybrid costing $30,000 [24,000]). Consistent with a rational economic perspective, we
predicted that in the control condition green products would be preferred when they are less
expensive than their non-green counterparts. Drawing on a costly signaling framework, however,
we predicted that activating status motives should reverse these preferences: Status motives
should lead green products to become more desirable when green products are relatively more
expensive because such products can signal both prosociality and wealth.
Method
Participants
One hundred and fifty-six students (50 males, 106 females) at a large public university
participated in the study for course credit. All participants came to the lab in small groups and
were seated at computers that were partitioned from each other.
Design and Procedure
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 23
The study design was a 2 (Motive: status, control) X 2 (Price of Green Product: more
expensive, less expensive) between-subjects design. As in the first two studies, all participants
first read either a short story that activated status motives or a control story. Akin to the method
in the second study, participants then indicated their relative preferences for green vs. non-green
products. Unlike in the first two studies, the products differed in their price.
Products. As in Study 1 and the public condition of Study 2, participants were asked to
consider that they were out shopping for three products: (1) cars, (2) backpacks, and (3)
dishwashers. For each product, participants chose between a green version and a counterpart
non-green version. The prices of the two counterpart products differed from each other by about
20%. For example, the green and non-green cars were both Honda Accords with the same
features as in Study 1. However, one of the cars was priced at $30,000, whereas the other car was
priced at $24,000. The backpack and dishwasher had similar (proportional) price differences.
Dependent Measures. Participants responded to a total of three items. As in Study 2, the
two versions of each product were presented on the screen at the same time. One of the products
was labeled “Product A” and the other was labeled “Product B.” After being told to consider that
they were out shopping, product participants were asked the following for each type of product:
“Which of these two products is more attractive to you?” Preferences were indicated on a 9-point
scale with the labels “definitely product A” and “definitely product B” at the endpoints.
As in Study 2, a three-way repeated-measures ANOVA with type of product as a withinsubjects
factor did not reveal that type of product interacted with motive, price, or both (all ps >
.35), meaning that the manipulations had a similar effect on all three products. The three
products were thus combined into a composite for the analyses. As in the first two studies,
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 24
preliminary analyses also did not reveal any significant interactions with participant sex (all ps >
.40), so subsequent analyses were collapsed across participant sex.
Results and Discussion
To control for counterbalancing whether products were presented on the left or right side
of the scale, ratings for of the dependent measures were transformed, so that higher numbers
indicated preference for green products. The key overall prediction in the study was that status
motives should have a different effect on the desirability for green products depending on the
price of the product. A two-way ANOVA with motive and price revealed this predicted
interaction, F(1, 152) = 6.78, p = .01, ?2 = .043 (see Figure 3). We next examined the specific
simple effects.
–Figure 3 about here–
We first examined product preferences in the control condition by testing whether the
relative price of the green product influenced its attractiveness. When no motives were activated,
green products were more attractive when they were cheaper than their non-green counterparts,
F(1,152) = 5.65, p = .019, d = .41 (see Figure 3). Thus, as would be expected from a rational
economic perspective, lowering the price of green products made them more desirable.
We next examined how status motives influenced preferences for green products relative
to the control condition. As indicated by the significant two-way interaction, the influence of
status motives on the attractiveness of green products depended on the relative price of those
products. Specifically, when green products were more expensive, status motives increased
desire for green products, F(1,152) = 4.35, p = .039, d = .33 (see Figure 3). Thus, status motives
made green products particularly attractive when those products cost more than the non-green
option. However, status motives did not increase desire for green products when such a choice
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 25
could undermine the signaling of resources. In fact, when green products were cheaper, status
motives somewhat decreased desire for these cheaper green products, F(1,152) = 2.55, p = .11, d
= .25 (see Figure 3), although this two-tailed simple effect test did not reach conventional levels
of significance.
In summary, status motives led prosocial green products to be desirable specifically when
green products cost more than their non-green counterparts. In fact, when green products were
relatively cheaper, status motives actually somewhat decreased desire for these inexpensive proenvironmental
products. This finding suggests that even though affordable green products are
more efficient at helping the environment, the purchase of such inexpensive green products
might undermine a person’s ability to signal his or her wealth via pro-environmental acts.
Indeed, consistent with a costly signaling perspective on altruism, a desire for status elicited
prosocial tendencies especially when the prosocial acts were costly.
General Discussion
This research started with a simple question: Why are conspicuously “green” products
such as the Toyota Prius, a hybrid gas-electric automobile, so successful in the marketplace? One
traditional explanation for the success of such products is that green products can save money on
energy costs. Yet it costs many thousands of dollars more to purchase a hybrid car such as the
Prius than a comparable conventional but highly fuel-efficient vehicle. Another traditional
explanation suggests that green products such as the Prius are purchased by environmental
activists who are willing to pay extra to do something significant to help the environment. Yet
surveys asking why Prius owners buy their cars show that environmental conservation is
relatively low on the list (Maynard, 2007, July 4).
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 26
To investigate the motive(s) behind the success of green products and other conspicuous
conservation behaviors, we turned to costly signaling theory and research on competitive
altruism, which suggest a link between altruistic acts and status (Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006).
Costly signaling theory posits that altruistic acts such as environmental conservation can function
to communicate a person’s willingness and ability to incur costs. Thus, in addition to signaling
that a person is prosocial rather than pro-self, altruism can simultaneously signal that one has
sufficient time, energy, money, or other resources to be able to afford to give away such
resources without a negative impact on fitness (Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997). Because prosociality
and resources are associated with an individual’s status in a group, we predicted that the
activation of status motives might produce prosocial/pro-environmental tendencies.
Supporting predictions, a series of experiments showed that activating status motives led
people to choose prosocial green products over more luxurious, equally priced non-green
products. In line with the predicted reputational benefits of self-sacrifice, status motives
increased desire for less-luxurious green products when shopping in public, but not in private.
Indeed, when people considered shopping in private, status motives produced a tendency toward
self-indulgence rather than self-sacrifice. Taken together, these findings suggest that while green
products may often offer less luxury, convenience, and performance than conventional goods,
green products offer an important status-enhancing reputational benefit: Such goods enable
people to appear pro-social rather than pro-self. Perhaps nowhere is this type of benefit clearer
than when one purchases the highly visible and easily identifiable Toyota Prius, which
essentially functions as a mobile, self-promoting billboard for pro-environmentalism.2
2 It is noteworthy that in our studies status motives had a similar effect on preferences for green cars and backpacks,
as they did on green batteries and soap. Clearly, some products are more visible than others, and it is certainly
conceivable that status motives might have the strongest influence on desire for the most visible green products.
Nevertheless, we find that merely making the concept of a public audience salient leads people to desire many types
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 27
Additional findings showed that status motives increased desirability of green products
especially when such products cost more—but not less—relative to non-green products. In line
with costly signaling theory, buying inexpensive green products can undermine a person’s ability
to signal wealth. This finding suggests that green products such as the Toyota Prius might be
selling well not despite their premium price tag, but perhaps in part because such products are
more expensive. Indeed, forty percent of hybrid owners indicate that they bought a green car as
an alternative to a traditional luxury car such as a BMW (Topline Strategy, 2007).
Whereas traditional approaches associate status motives with luxury and self-indulgence,
we show that activating status motives can lead people to shy away from luxury and instead
choose self-sacrifice. This counterintuitive finding and two suppressors of this effect—audience
and product cost—were clearly derived from costly signaling theory and research on competitive
altruism, demonstrating experimentally the links between altruism, reputation, and status.
Practical Implications
Whereas status motives have traditionally been associated with selfishness, our
framework suggests that activating status motives may be an effective strategy for promoting
pro-environmental or other types of prosocial behavior.3 Indeed, while economic or
environmental concerns can certainly foster green behavior, the social aspects of conservation
are often ignored. Yet we find that social motives such as concern for status can be significant in
fostering green behavior. Our findings suggest that marketers of green products are well-advised
of green products. Our findings are clearly consistent with the notion that actions in public can influence one’s
reputation to a much greater extent than actions in private.
3 Note that in our studies, status motives did not lead people to completely move away from non-green products and
switch to green products. This finding does not imply that status motives have little influence on actual purchases of
green products. Instead, we specifically chose the non-green products and the descriptions of these products to make
them highly desirable, especially relative to their non-green counterparts. Despite the high desirability of the nongreen
products, activating status motives nevertheless moved people away from the desirable non-green product to
the (initially much less desirable) green product.
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 28
to clearly link such products to status (e.g., celebrity endorsers, prestigious events), especially
when a green product is relatively expensive (e.g., when such products have high development
costs and cannot be sold at a loss). As indicated by Study 2, however, a key component of
harnessing the power of status motives to benefit social welfare necessitates that the prosocial
acts be visible to others, whereby such acts can clearly influence the well-doers reputation. For
example, non-profit organizations are well-advised to give their benefactors visible signs, tags,
or badges (e.g., the highly visible yellow Livestrong armband signifying cancer donations), so
that benefactors can clearly display their self-sacrificing and status-enhancing acts.
A costly signaling framework also suggests that it would be a mistake to link green
products to status when such products are relatively cheap because inexpensive products can
undermine the signaling of wealth by its owner. Indeed, a key counterintuitive aspect of this
framework is that attempts to make green products cheaper, easier to buy, or more time-saving
can actually undercut their utility as a signal of environmentalist/altruist dedication. For example,
in contrast to standard economic models, a costly signaling framework suggests that electric cars
might be seen as more prestigious and more desirable if recharging stations are harder to find and
take longer to recharge the batteries, rather than being ubiquitous, fast, and efficient.
It is important to note that the current studies do not imply that status motives will lead
people across cultures to engage in pro-environmental action per se. Recall that costly signaling
theory and the notion of competitive altruism state that status is associated with prosociality, not
environmentalism. Whether a given behavior is considered prosocial, of course, will certainly
differ among cultures and sub-cultures. In current-day Western society, for example, proenvironmental
behaviors are generally viewed as prosocial. Indeed, our product pre-test findings
in Study 1 indicate as such. But in a rural Chinese village, for instance, the state of the
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 29
environment may not be an important social issue, nor might village residents even have the
option to purchase green products. In fact, activating a status motive for a rural Chinese
entrepreneur may lead him to pollute rather than conserve the environment, such as by building a
factory near the village. Yet this outcome is by no means inconsistent with an understanding of
status and altruism from a costly signaling perspective: Although the factory may pollute the
environment, building the factory close to the village may be seen as highly prosocial by the
local community members because it creates many needed jobs for local residents.
Alternative Explanations
The hypotheses in this set of studies were derived from costly signaling theory (Zahavi,
1975; Miller, 2000), research on the competitive altruism hypothesis (Roberts, 1998; Van Vugt,
Roberts, & Hardy, 2007), and research on evolutionary social cognition (e.g., Haselton & Nettle,
2006; Maner et al., 2005; Griskevicius et al., in press; Kenrick et al., in press). There is no doubt
that predictions regarding status and green consumption might be generated by alternative
perspectives. It is not clear, however, whether these other perspectives would offer as
parsimonious and complete an account of the nuanced pattern of results obtained in these studies.
For example, at first blush, one potential explanation of our findings may be that
environmentally friendly products are perceived as unique and fashionable, and that status
motives might simply lead people to want to be unique, different, and fashionable. Yet not only
are green products today rather common, but the non-green products in the current studies are
likely to be seen as equally (if not more) chic and unique. For instance, having a non-green car
with the latest GPS navigation system, a dishwasher with a revolutionary drying system, or a
lamp coated with a space-age material to make it resistant to dust connotes uniqueness and the
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 30
latest luxury. Yet across studies status motives led people to forego these more luxurious and
unique goods for products that could signal caring about the environment.
A pure social learning model (i.e., a blank slate model) might suggest that people have
simply been differentially rewarded for owning green products in today’s Western society.
However, even if people in Western cultures today are rewarded more for behaving proenvironmentally,
a pure social learning perspective does not adequately explain why such
individuals are rewarded more. In contrast, our evolutionary framework offers a parsimonious
explanation regarding both the ultimate function and the proximate mechanism for prosocial
behavior. Of course, it is important to note that social learning theories are not mutually
exclusive with evolutionary accounts, since evolutionary theorists presume that learning across
cultures is a function of evolutionary constraints, and that many behaviors involve an adaptive
interplay of learning and evolved predispositions. For example, the very implications of carbon
emissions for climate change must be learned socially. We are not aware, however, of a priori
predictions made by pure social learning theories for the very specific patterns of results obtained
here—patterns that follow directly from considerations of costly signaling theory and research on
competitive altruism.
Finally, although our findings are consistent with costly signaling theory and research on
competitive altruism, it is important to note that the current research was not intended to be a test
of different theoretical accounts of the evolution of altruism. For example, our findings regarding
conspicuous conservation are also consistent with an indirect reciprocity account of the evolution
of altruism (Alexander, 1987; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; see Milinski et al., 2006). One key
difference between a costly signaling and an indirect reciprocity interpretation of altruism is the
ultimate function of a prosocial reputation. From an indirect reciprocity perspective, a prosocial
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 31
reputation functions primarily to motivate others to cooperate with the prosocial individual; from
a costly signaling perspective, a prosocial reputation functions primarily to signal an underlying
quality (e.g., one’s willingness and ability to be prosocial). In this sense, a costly signaling
perspective on altruism is broader because the signaling of various underlying qualities via
helping can in turn motivate others to cooperate with the prosocial individual. Our research was
not intended to be a critical test between these two somewhat overlapping evolutionary accounts
of altruism. Indeed, although our findings are consistent with research on competitive altruism,
we did not examine directly whether status motives lead people to try to outdo each other via
altruism. Future research examining the extent with which altruism is competitive is welcome.
Limitations and Future Directions
One limitation of the current research is that our experiments did not involve the actual
purchasing of products. Instead, the current research focused on the context-specific features of
psychological adaptations for status and altruism. Future research on how status motives
influence purchases is clearly welcome. Nevertheless, there is good reason to believe that our
experimental findings are likely to correspond to actual behavior. For instance, our findings on
product choice fit well with self-report data on the reasons why people purchase conspicuous
green products (Maynard, 2007; Topline Strategy Group, 2007). Similarly, our findings are
highly consistent with studies of competitive altruism across cultures (e.g., Gurven et al., 2000;
Smith & Bird, 2000; Roberts, 1998; see Van Vugt, Roberts, & Hardy, 2007). Furthermore,
although we didn’t measure behaviors, we did measure product choices (i.e., people chose which
product they would buy) and behavioral intentions, which in comparison to attitudes, have been
shown to have a relatively strong relationship to behaviors (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).
This work also opens the gate for many avenues of potentially fruitful future research.
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 32
One important question for future research concerns what exactly is pro-environmental behavior
signaling. That is, although a costly signaling perspective suggests that pro-environmental
behavior (and altruism more generally) signals some underlying quality or qualities, it is
currently unclear what qualities such behavior is signaling (e.g., intelligence, leadership, health,
etc.). One possibility is that such behavior might serve as a signal of universal personality
dimensions related to the Big Five (Miller, 2009). For example, green products may be signals of
high agreeableness, and perhaps even high conscientiousness and high openness to experience.
A second important question for future research concerns how displays of proenvironmentalism
(and altruism more generally) are perceived/interpreted by others. That is, a
costly signaling framework predicts not only psychological adaptations for displays of costly
signals (e.g., Griskevicius et al., 2007), but also psychological adaptations for the perception and
interpretation of such displays. The perception adaptations related to costly signaling have yet to
be examined, but it is likely that perception will be different depending on the type of audience.
For example, whereas the current research shows that status motives appear to generally lead to
costly altruistic displays, the presence of some audiences may produce vastly different displays,
such as leading status-seeking young males to display dominance rather than self-sacrifice.
A third avenue for future research involves an examination of how individual differences
influence the extent to which status motives lead to self-sacrifice (e.g., Campbell, Simpson,
Stewart, & Manning, 2003; Kurzban & Houser, 2005; Van Lange et al., 1997, 2007). For
instance, individuals follow different strategies to acquire status: some acquire status via
dominance (i.e., forcefully gaining status via aggression) and some acquire status via prestige
(i.e., gaining status via social influence and respect; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Johnson, Burk,
& Kirkpatrick, 2007). Those oriented toward a prestige strategy may especially use self-sacrifice
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 33
to attain status, whereas those oriented toward a dominance strategy may not. Moreover, the
effectiveness of a self-sacrifice strategy may vary across observers. Individuals differ in the
degree to which they object to anti-social, selfish behaviors (Tybur, Lieberman, & Griskevicius,
in press; Van den Bergh, Dewitte, & De Cremer, 2006), and those who are more bothered by
such behaviors may give more respect to those who self-sacrifice (e.g., environmental
conservationists) and less respect to those who behave selfishly (e.g., Hummer drivers).
Conclusion
As stated at the beginning, the Roman philosopher Publilius Syrus argued that “A good
reputation is more valuable than money.” This maxim, often repeated in modern societies,
suggests that there is a trade-off between being nice (having a good reputation) and being selfish
(having money). But considered from a costly signaling perspective, this trade-off may be
illusory. Because earning a good reputation can increase an individual’s status in a group, to be
altruistic is to act in one’s own self-interest. That is, given that self-sacrifice can communicate
the altruist’s willingness and ability to incur the costs of helping, a good reputation already
signals that a person has the resources to afford such a reputation, which is important in attaining
things that are difficult to purchase with money directly (e.g., friendship, love). Thus, even if
nice guys do not appear to finish first today, nice guys’ genes may finish first generations from
now.
Knowing that a desire for status can spur self-sacrifice also presents a powerful tool for
motivating pro-social and pro-environmental action. Indeed, pro-environmental behavior may
not only be a viable method of attaining individual status; it may also be a vital method of
preserving the status of our species.
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 34
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Figure 1: Percentage of people choosing pro-environmental “green” products over more
luxurious non-green counterpart products as a function of active motive (Study 1).
MOTIVE
Car
Soap
Dishwasher
CONTROL STATUS
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 45
Figure 2: Preference for “green” products relative to more luxurious non-green products as a
function of active motive and whether purchasing is public or private (Study 2).
PRIVATE
AUDIENCE
PUBLIC
3.0
3.5
4.0
MOTIVE
CONTROL
2.5
Prefer
GREEN
Product
Prefer
NON-GREEN
Product STATUS
4.5
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 46
Figure 3: Preference for green relative to non-green products as a function of active motive and
whether the green product costs more or costs less than the non-green counterpart (Study 3).
RELATIVE PRICE
4.0
4.5
5.0
MOTIVE
CONTROL
3.5
Prefer
GREEN
Product
Prefer
NON-GREEN
Product STATUS
Green LESS
Green MORE
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 47
Appendix
Products and product features (Study 1)
Sub-Zero ED40 Elite Dishwasher ($1,100)
Comes in choice of stainless steel or white exterior with black chrome trim
Features a revolutionary heated drying system that eliminates water spots
Has powerful water sprays but produces no sound
Sub-Zero Eco-Trend Dishwasher ($1,100)
Has a standard 40-minute running cycle
Uses a re-circulating water system to save water
Is made with recycled components
Honda Accord EX-L V-6 ($30,000)
Has a high-performing 244 horsepower engine
Fully equipped with leather seats, GPS navigation system, and a full stereo system
Averages 22 miles per gallon
Honda Accord HYBRID ($30,000)
Has a low-emission hybrid 120 horsepower engine
Comes with standard cloth seats and standard AM-FM radio
Averages a 35 miles per gallon
Lysol Industrial Strength Household Cleaner ($7)
Awarded most effective cleaner on the market award
Chemically engineered to cut through the toughest grease, rust, and mold
Kills 99.9% of germs on contact
Lysol Natural Household Cleaner ($7)
Made from biodegradable non-toxic materials
Contains no acids, dyes, or harsh chemicals
Not tested on animals
Status, Reputation, and Altruism 48
Products and product features (Study 2)
Target brand Chromium-Plated Lamp with Silk Shade ($60)
Lamp frame is plated with Chromium that is resistant to dulling
Uses an adjustable 150-watt incandescent bulb with four brightness settings
Silk shade produces optimal ambient light filtering
Target brand Efficiency Low-Wattage Lamp with Organic Cloth Shade ($60)
Lamp frame is constructed in a clean and waste-friendly facility that does not produce toxic waste
Comes with a single-setting fluorescent bulb that uses only 15% of the electricity of conventional bulbs
Cloth shade made from recycled organic cotton fibers
North Face KD100 Ultra-Strength Backpack ($64)
Contains eight different storage compartments for maximum versatility
Stylish design crafted with water-resistant coating
Solid construction lasts twice as long as the next leading brand on the market
North Face Eco-Life Backpack ($64)
Made from 100% organic fibers
Utilitarian design minimizes waste in the construction process
Comes with instructions on how to recycle the backpack when you are done with it
Energizer e2 Lithium AAA Batteries ($8)
Last almost twice as long as conventional alkaline batteries
Weigh 1/3 less than standard alkaline batteries
Perform in even the most extreme temperatures from -40 to 140 degrees F
Energizer Enviromax AAA Batteries ($8)
Contain zero amounts of lead, mercury, and cadmium
Easiest battery to recycle
Awarded “Most Environmentally Friendly” battery