advertisement
advertisement

This is page 2 of:

During A Data Breach, Customers Will Stay—Unless You Alienate Them One At A Time

October 26th, 2011

It is far cheaper to get a new card than to reimburse someone for a 70-inch, high-definition, 1080p, 3D-capable LED TV with surround sound bought with a compromised credit-card number. These “costs” are called reasonable mitigation costs.

In the Hannaford case, the merchant sought to have the court declare that the chain was not legally responsible for these costs. Sure, Hannaford reasoned, if your card number was actually used as a result of the compromise, it might have to reimburse. But the chain argued that the mitigation costs were too speculative, citing other cases where, for example, a data tape or laptop was lost and the court did not force the company losing the tape or machine to pay for credit-watch services for the thousands or millions of people whose names might have appeared on those lost tapes.

The Hannaford federal court correctly pointed out that what might be reasonable mitigation when there is a mere remote possibility of an identity fraud or identity theft is not the same as what is reasonable mitigation when there has been an actual theft of identity information by hackers who have used this type of information to commit identity theft and credit-card fraud. In such cases, card reissuance and credit-watch lists are perfectly reasonable and, therefore, should be compensated by the allegedly negligent merchant.

Hannaford won most issues in the case when the court ruled that the chain had no special “duty” to protect consumer data under Maine law and that many non-economic damages (e.g., not lost money) could not be recovered under the language of Maine’s consumer-protection statute. Hannaford also won when the court ruled that these speculative and remote losses (like anxiety over possible future fraud) could not be recovered under Maine law, which requires a person suing for consumer fraud to suffer a “loss of money or property.”

But even on the issue on which Hannaford “lost”—the issue of mitigation damages—it ultimately won by losing. Merchants need to understand that the “Otter Letter” is not a viable strategy for customer retention. It’s not a good idea to tell consumers, whose only problem is that they trusted you with their credit-card number, that they—not you—have to pay the reasonable costs of getting a new card. A better approach is to honestly tell them whether you think card cancellation or replacement or fraud-watch lists are appropriate in light of the nature of the breach. If it is a data tape sitting on a UPS truck somewhere in Des Moines, Iowa, with a bad tracking number, cancellation is unreasonable and overkill. In the Hannaford case, I probably would have cancelled my card, wouldn’t you?

To the extent the case mandates that merchants treat their customers right, the case should be unsurprising. For this we needed teams of lawyers?

If you disagree with me, I’ll see you in court, buddy. If you agree with me, however, I would love to hear from you.


advertisement

Comments are closed.

Newsletters

StorefrontBacktalk delivers the latest retail technology news & analysis. Join more than 60,000 retail IT leaders who subscribe to our free weekly email. Sign up today!
advertisement

Most Recent Comments

Why Did Gonzales Hackers Like European Cards So Much Better?

I am still unclear about the core point here-- why higher value of European cards. Supply and demand, yes, makes sense. But the fact that the cards were chip and pin (EMV) should make them less valuable because that demonstrably reduces the ability to use them fraudulently. Did the author mean that the chip and pin cards could be used in a country where EMV is not implemented--the US--and this mis-match make it easier to us them since the issuing banks may not have as robust anti-fraud controls as non-EMV banks because they assumed EMV would do the fraud prevention for them Read more...
Two possible reasons that I can think of and have seen in the past - 1) Cards issued by European banks when used online cross border don't usually support AVS checks. So, when a European card is used with a billing address that's in the US, an ecom merchant wouldn't necessarily know that the shipping zip code doesn't match the billing code. 2) Also, in offline chip countries the card determines whether or not a transaction is approved, not the issuer. In my experience, European issuers haven't developed the same checks on authorization requests as US issuers. So, these cards might be more valuable because they are more likely to get approved. Read more...
A smart card slot in terminals doesn't mean there is a reader or that the reader is activated. Then, activated reader or not, the U.S. processors don't have apps certified or ready to load into those terminals to accept and process smart card transactions just yet. Don't get your card(t) before the terminal (horse). Read more...
The marketplace does speak. More fraud capacity translates to higher value for the stolen data. Because nearly 100% of all US transactions are authorized online in real time, we have less fraud regardless of whether the card is Magstripe only or chip and PIn. Hence, $10 prices for US cards vs $25 for the European counterparts. Read more...
@David True. The European cards have both an EMV chip AND a mag stripe. Europeans may generally use the chip for their transactions, but the insecure stripe remains vulnerable to skimming, whether it be from a false front on an ATM or a dishonest waiter with a handheld skimmer. If their stripe is skimmed, the track data can still be cloned and used fraudulently in the United States. If European banks only detect fraud from 9-5 GMT, that might explain why American criminals prefer them over American bank issued cards, who have fraud detection in place 24x7. Read more...

StorefrontBacktalk
Our apologies. Due to legal and security copyright issues, we can't facilitate the printing of Premium Content. If you absolutely need a hard copy, please contact customer service.