Evan Schuman's StorefrontBacktalk

Then there’s this one: “The pharmacy is not told Ali’s birth date or the reason for the prescription.” Wait a second. You want the pharmacy to know these things. That’s how bad prescriptions—where the background is unknown—are flagged by alert pharmacists. Shouldn’t a prescription for penile dysfunction for a 4-year-old raise eyebrows? And do you really want the pharmacist to not be told the reason for the prescription?

Here’s a good one that involves mobile carriers: “Consider the situation in which a woman, Keisha, requests medical information from the hospital her husband, John, has recently visited. The hospital requires that any such requests be authenticated using a high-assurance credential. In addition, the hospital requires patient approval before releasing personal medical information to other individuals. Keisha uses the browser on her cell phone to access the hospital Web site. The browser authenticates the hospital’s Web site domain so that Keisha knows she is not sending information to a fraudulent site. Keisha has a digital certificate issued by her trustmarked cell phone carrier (also her IDP), and the hospital validates the authenticity of the credential, her cell phone and her digital identity. Next, to receive patient approval for the release of personal records, the hospital obtains validation from John’s primary-care clinic (the AP). The primary-care provider validates and maintains the appropriate attributes in the form of John’s approval to release his medical information to Keisha. The hospital uses the clinic’s assertion as proof that John digitally signed a medical release authorization form for Keisha, so it allows Keisha to view John’s test results. Although all of these operations occur, they happen in the background. All Keisha has to do is browse to the secure Web site on her credentialed smartphone.”

Whoa! This is trusting technology way too much.

This last one was certainly written with the best of intentions, but read this example from the report from the perspective of a terrorist: “A large national emergency erupts on the coastline and a call for support results in an influx of first responders at the emergency site. A federal agency is tracking the event using its global satellite network and can share detailed information with state and local officials, utility providers and emergency first responders from all over the country. Each participant in the information exchange uses an interoperable credential issued by his employer to log into the information-sharing portal. The portal automatically directs responders to information relevant to them based on their duties and affiliated organization. Joel, a doctor, logs in and sees the triage report with injury lists at each of the local emergency shelters. The hospital where he is a resident acts as the attribute provider to verify his status as a doctor and his specialty. The portal indicates that his specialty is in high demand at a center half a mile away, where there is a long waiting time for care. In addition, Joel accesses an application on his registered cell phone to track changing local conditions. It warns him that two bridges in his area have recently been reported as unsafe and one intersection should be avoided. Joel uses this information to safely navigate to the center where he can be authenticated as a licensed specialist and can most help the victims of the emergency.”

Security is a wonderful thing, as is technology. But a good security approach is one that understands that no security approach is safe and that multiple checks and balances must always be in place. Compassion is great, but triple redundancy is better.