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If Apple Can’t Stop One Fraudster, Can It Ever Challenge Visa?

July 18th, 2012

Even more disappointing (or frightening) is the fact that Apple has been unable to shut down the fraud. Apple blocked Borodin’s IP address and asked his ISP to shut down the server over the weekend, but Borodin just shifted the server to another country and kept going. The exploit is simple enough that there appears to be no easy way for Apple to stop the fraud without rearchitecting its transaction process.

In itself, that type of overhaul wouldn’t be a bad thing. As much as it would complicate life for app developers and users, it means Apple would have a much more secure transaction system. If Apple can lock down in-app transactions, it can credibly claim to be able to do in-store mobile payments securely, too.

But as things stand now, Apple’s credibility is eroding just as the company is dipping a toe into mobile payments. The actual number of fraudulent transactions isn’t high. But what everyone remembers is that with every faked transaction, the seller isn’t getting paid. If Apple’s goal is to convince retailers it should handle the money, this isn’t the way to do it.

Then there’s the collateral damage to Apple’s technical cred. It turns out that account IDs and passwords are being sent unencrypted—which wasn’t really safe even when Apple thought the only place they were going was to Apple’s servers. The fact that Apple requires app developers (read that as “retailers”) to essentially provide their own transaction security to confirm receipts sounds simultaneously cheap and unrealistic.

And Apple’s assumption that no users would make adjustments to their iPhones or iPads to steal from those retailers seems incredibly naive.

There’s bound to be a learning curve with mobile payments, especially when it comes to security. Google has had its fumbled demonstrations and security holes, and PayPal is still depending on its insecure phone-number-plus-PIN system in-store. (ISIS still hasn’t officially started its mobile payments trial scheduled for this summer, but there are still a few weeks of summer left.) However, hardly anyone is using any of these mobile payment services, so the risk has been minimal.

But for Apple, mobile payments are already a billion-dollar business—and that’s before an NFC-enabled iPhone makes in-store payments possible.

Everyone’s assumption is that if anyone can convince mobile users to use tap-to-pay with their phones, it’s Apple. That’s still the most likely scenario, no matter how long Apple waits for the best time to launch in-store mobile payments.

But if Apple can’t clean up its current mobile payments mess—and fast—it will effectively shoot itself in the foot, with both retailers and customers. If that happens, no matter how much we like the idea, we’ll never get the chance to see whether or not Apple really does represent competition with Visa.


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Why Did Gonzales Hackers Like European Cards So Much Better?

I am still unclear about the core point here-- why higher value of European cards. Supply and demand, yes, makes sense. But the fact that the cards were chip and pin (EMV) should make them less valuable because that demonstrably reduces the ability to use them fraudulently. Did the author mean that the chip and pin cards could be used in a country where EMV is not implemented--the US--and this mis-match make it easier to us them since the issuing banks may not have as robust anti-fraud controls as non-EMV banks because they assumed EMV would do the fraud prevention for them Read more...
Two possible reasons that I can think of and have seen in the past - 1) Cards issued by European banks when used online cross border don't usually support AVS checks. So, when a European card is used with a billing address that's in the US, an ecom merchant wouldn't necessarily know that the shipping zip code doesn't match the billing code. 2) Also, in offline chip countries the card determines whether or not a transaction is approved, not the issuer. In my experience, European issuers haven't developed the same checks on authorization requests as US issuers. So, these cards might be more valuable because they are more likely to get approved. Read more...
A smart card slot in terminals doesn't mean there is a reader or that the reader is activated. Then, activated reader or not, the U.S. processors don't have apps certified or ready to load into those terminals to accept and process smart card transactions just yet. Don't get your card(t) before the terminal (horse). Read more...
The marketplace does speak. More fraud capacity translates to higher value for the stolen data. Because nearly 100% of all US transactions are authorized online in real time, we have less fraud regardless of whether the card is Magstripe only or chip and PIn. Hence, $10 prices for US cards vs $25 for the European counterparts. Read more...
@David True. The European cards have both an EMV chip AND a mag stripe. Europeans may generally use the chip for their transactions, but the insecure stripe remains vulnerable to skimming, whether it be from a false front on an ATM or a dishonest waiter with a handheld skimmer. If their stripe is skimmed, the track data can still be cloned and used fraudulently in the United States. If European banks only detect fraud from 9-5 GMT, that might explain why American criminals prefer them over American bank issued cards, who have fraud detection in place 24x7. Read more...

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